The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency just announced that it has cited DuPont Co. and ordered the company’s Belle, W.Va., chemical plant to take a variety of actions as a result of January’s phosgene leak that killed longtime plant worker Danny Fish.
I’ve posted a copy of the EPA order here, and in its press release the agency said:
The order results from an EPA inspection of the facility following three releases in January, including the release that caused the death. Based on EPA’s inspection and available information about the operation of the facility, EPA has determined that the facility has not satisfied Clean Air Act requirements that are designed to help prevent accidental releases and minimize the consequences of releases that do occur.
Those violations include:
* Failure to identify hazards which may result from releases using appropriate hazard assessment techniques;
* Failure to design and maintain a safety facility; and
* Failure to minimize the consequences of accidental releases that do occur.
We’ve raised questions before about the phosgene hose that leaked, exposing Fish to the toxic gas that eventually killed him. And the EPA order has these interesting things to say about that hose:
* Standard operating procedures called for the hose to have been made within six months of its installation, and for the hose to be replaced every two months “due to the extremely hazardous nature of phosgene.” But, the hose that failed at the DuPont Belle plant was made on May 27, 2008 and not installed until June 2009. So, it had been made a year before it was installed, and had been in service for three times longer than recommended.
* The normal operating pressure of that phosgene transfer hose is between 55-65 pounds-force per square inch gauge, or psig. American Society of Mechanical Engineers codes call for such hoses to be leak tested at 110 percent of their design pressure. But, DuPont only required its phosgene hose to be tested at 50 psig, which is less than the maximum operating pressure.
* Standard operating procedures did not have specific and complete instructions for the hookup and removal of the transfer hose.
* DuPont used a flexible, braided steel hose to transfer phosgene from storage cylinders to a production unit, despite the fact that its own process safety management guide says “the use of flexible hose should be avoided in these services.”
In its news release, EPA said:
EPA’s order requires DuPont to, among other things, review all of the facility processes that may pose a threat of accidental releases, provide a report to EPA detailing the review, and implement any modifications to standard operating procedures that are warranted as a result of this review. The order provides that DuPont may request a conference with EPA concerning the alleged violations and requirements of the order.
I’ve asked DuPont for a response, but have not heard back from the company yet.
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Here’s a response from DuPont, just issued:
We are aware of the EPA order to the Belle plant and are in the process of reviewing it. We will continue to work cooperatively with EPA and the other federal, state and local agencies as we continue our internal investigations of the incidents that occurred at the Belle site in January, 2010. Safety is a core value at DuPont and is our top priority. We are committed to operating all of our facilities safely and in full compliance every day.