Archive for the ‘Mine Safety’ Category

Where did Gov. Tomblin get miner drug-testing bill?

Friday, February 10, 2012

We all know that the official federal investigation of the Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster didn’t fine that drugs or alcohol had anything to do with the April 5, 2010, explosion that killed 29 West Virginia coal miners. And it’s clear that separate reports by independent investigator Davitt McAteer and the United Mine Workers union made no recommendations about instituting a state-run drug-testing program for miners, especially when most of the state’s major coal producers already have such programs.

So how did Gov. Earl Ray Tomblin come up with the cornerstone of his mine safety legislation, a proposal to require drug-testing of miners?

Well, to hear the governor tell it — on statewide radio no less — the proposal was among the measures the state Office of Miners Health, Safety and Training recommended be included in the administration’s legislative response to the worst U.S. coal-mining disaster in nearly 40 years.  That sure sounded like what the governor said on Thursday, when he appeared on the MetroNews program “Talkline,” to defend his proposal following two days of legislative hearings that included harsh criticisms of it. The governor said:

My staff sat down with both labor and industry in joint meetings, when the recommendations come to us from the director of mines to propose this bill … This is not something that just came unilaterally from my office.

That just didn’t sound right to me … What I knew was that the state mine safety office back before the session had sent the governor’s office nine legislative proposals to the governor’s office. Some of those ended up in Gov. Tomblin’s bill once it was finally introduced. Others didn’t. But drug-testing language was not among those recommendations.

I asked the public relations spokeswomen for Gov. Tomblin and for the state mine safety office about this … and here’s what gubernatorial communications director Jaqueline Proctor told me in an e-mail yesterday afternoon:

OMHST did offer 9 recommendations to the Governor’s office.  A drug testing program was not included. The Governor did not intend to suggest otherwise.  It should be noted, however, that OMHST strongly believes that we need a drug testing policy.   He believes that his legislation will make our mines safer, and he looks forward to working with the Legislature in accomplishing that goal.

So who did recommend this language? Whose idea was it to turn a bill about Upper Big Branch — a disaster caused not by drugs or alcohol, but by the flagrant violation of long-standing and recognized safety practices by Massey Energy — into a piece of legislation aimed at making coal miners relieve themselves in a cup?

Good question. I’ve asked the governor’s office that, but haven’t heard back from them yet. If they respond, I’ll update this blog post.

In the meantime, it’s worth remembering that Gov. Tomblin and his staff made significant and industry-friendly changes in a committee-written Marcellus Shale bill after meeting with oil and gas lobbyists — and then refused to make public any correspondence or other documents about those discussions with the industry, saying company lobbyists had acted as “consultants” for them on the issue

Alpha hit with another ‘imminent danger’ order

Wednesday, February 8, 2012

Here’s the latest SEC filing from Alpha Natural Resources:

On February 2, 2012, Marfork Coal Company, Inc. (“Marfork”), a subsidiary of Alpha Natural Resources, Inc., received an imminent danger order under section 107(a) of the Mine Act alleging that a miner had been observed entering an area of unsupported roof at the Slip Ridge Cedar Grove Mine (the “Mine”) located near Whitesville, West Virginia.  No injuries occurred, no hazardous conditions were cited, and the order did not require withdrawal of miners from the mine.

Marfork has a safety policy which prohibits entry into areas of unsupported roof.  Mine personnel have reviewed that policy with the Mine’s workforce, and the order has been terminated.

Coal industry opposed Bush drug-testing policy because it gave miners a chance to seek treatment

Tuesday, February 7, 2012

Davitt McAteer, who led the independent team that investigated the Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster was just on Hoppy Kercheval’s Talkline statewide radio show, giving West Virginians a preview of his testimony this afternoon up at the Capitol. Lawmakers are holding the second in two days of discussions about rival mine safety bills proposed by Gov. Earl Ray Tomblin and the House Democratic leadership.

We learned during yesterday’s session that the problem of drug abuse in the mines — the cornerstone of the governor’s bill — had nothing to do with the Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster. Really, anybody who has followed the issue knew that already, but the governor’s effort to get the industry bill through under the guise of his legislative response to UBB prompted lawmakers to ask the question.

On the radio this morning, Davitt McAteer reported that his team’s review of autopsies of the miners who died at Upper Big Branch revealed no drug issues — only one mine who had a small amount of cough syrup in his system.

It’s always, well, interesting, to listen in to long sessions where our state’s lawmakers ask questions. It was pretty disappointing yesterday, though, when nobody bothered to ask the witnesses the crucial question at hand: How specifically would either of these bills prevent the next mine disaster?

Maybe House leaders would have done so, if they weren’t so busy chasing down stuff related to the governor’s drug testing proposal, which while perhaps an issue worth dealing with, threatens to take attention away from any reforms that are actually based on the state’s experience at Upper Big Branch. Of course, maybe that’s exactly what the coal industry wants, as expressed in West Virginia Coal Association lobbyist Chris Hamilton’s remarks yesterday:

I would never attempt to defend what happened at UBB.  But please, don’t anyone think that is common place or happens elsewhere in the industry.

In any event, all this talk about the governor’s drug testing proposal made me want to go back and see what stance the National Mining Association took on the MSHA drug-testing proposal made in 2008 during the Bush Administration. Surprise: The industry opposed this proposed rule, at least in part because the language would have required coal operators to give miners who test positive the first time a chance to seek treatment and get their lives straightened out before they could be fired.

NMA lobbyist Bruce Watzman (pictured above) explained his organization’s thoughts during an MSHA public hearing in October 2008:

Most importantly, we believe that by denying mine operators the ability to exercise all disciplinary actions for a first offense of the operator’s program, up to and including dismissing the employee, the proposed rule will diminish rather than enhance the current level of workplace safety provided by NMA’s members.

Bruce elaborated in this NMA comment letter, calling the language the “most far-reaching regulatory provision” in the MSHA proposal:

NMA urges that consideration be given to whether the Mine Act provides authority for MSHA to displace the employment-at-will doctrine as it relates to the employer-employee relationship. More specifically, NMA does not believe that a legally sound basis has been articulated to substantiate authority for MSHA, under the Mine Act, to displace the employer-employee relationship under state law as it relates to more stringent policies for an alcohol- and drug-free workplace nor do we believe such Mine Act authority exists.

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Mine safety: Are lawmakers doing all they could?

Monday, February 6, 2012

Today and tomorrow, the House and Senate Judiciary committees at the West Virginia Legislature are holding informational sessions to discuss the Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster and to hear about at least two pending pieces of mine safety legislation.

We’ve talked before about Gov. Earl Ray Tomblin’s bill (see here and here), and you can read that legislation for yourself here (It’s SB 448, the same as HB 4351)  The House leadership’s bill was discussed here and the full text is available here.

Probably the most fascinating thing about all of this is how Gov. Tomblin — perhaps with the help of some coal industry lobbyists — managed to turn legislation that was prompted as a response to the worst U.S. coal-mining disaster in 40 years into a drug-testing bill for the mining industry.

As best I’ve been able to tell from reading the reports out so far, there’s absolutely no evidence — none at all — that drug use had anything at all to do with the Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster. Yet a drug-testing mandate is the cornerstone of the governor’s bill. And somehow the legislation doesn’t include a requirement that mine operators provide drug treatment for miners with problems, even if those problems developed while a miner was taking prescription medication as part of recovering from a workplace injury.

Over at the State Journal, Taylor Kuykendall did a piece that compared the governor’s bill and the House leadership proposal.

But what about what isn’t in either of the bills?

– There’s really no legitimate question that the Upper Big Branch explosion on April 5, 2010, was the almost inevitable result of a a huge buildup of highly explosive coal dust in the Massey Energy mine. Yet neither piece of legislation does much about this problem. Gov. Tomblin’s bill purports to do so, by really all it’s doing is repeating a tighter rock-dusting standard that’s already been adopted by the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration.

If lawmakers wanted to take the lead in this area, they could mandate that every underground coal mine in West Virginia do what U.S. Attorney Booth Goodwin has forced Alpha Natural Resources to do: Install new meters that would allow better monitoring and detection of coal-dust problems and violations.

– Independent investigator Davitt McAteer’s team found that most of the miners who died at Upper Big Branch already were suffering from black lung, a deadly disease that claimed the lives of 10,000 U.S. coal miners in the last decade. While black lung wasn’t a contributing factor in the disaster, the McAteer teams’ findings were a clear indication of the continuing public health disaster from this disease.

Public health experts know how to end black lung — tighten the legal limit of coal dust in the nation’s underground mines. But the industry has succeeded in getting its friends on Congress to block the Obama administration’s effort in that direction. So if Gov. Tomblin really believes that one coal-mining death is too many, he could urge lawmakers to amend his bill to implement the tighter standard in all of West Virginia’s underground coal mines.

Those are just two examples, drawn from a very quick review of reports issued by McAteer, MSHA and the United Mine Workers of America … Look for more recommendations during testimony today and tomorrow, and watch and see if the governor and legislative leaders quickly adopt the absolute strongest among those recommendations.

W.Va. Coal Symposium: Bad timing for Alpha

Thursday, February 2, 2012

There’s a fair amount of coverage out there this morning from yesterday’s start of the West Virginia Coal Association’s annual symposium, being held over at the Charleston Civic Center. A few examples:

– Vicki Smith from the AP reported that MSHA officials say the nation’s coal mines have made huge strides in safety, pointing to a dramatic reduction in the number of accidents and injuries in the nation’s single largest district in southern West Virginia.

– We ran my story in the Gazette about a presentation in which former U.S. Attorney Bill Wilmoth, who defended one-time Massey security director Hughie Elbert Stover, advised coal industry officials to be much more cautious in agreeing to talk with federal investigators, now that prosecutors have begun stepping up criminal cases involving lying to those investigators.

– The State Journal’s Taylor Kuykendall posted stories about extended cut mining, and about MSHA’s views of post-UBB compliance around the industry.

I wandered over to the Civic Center for some of yesterday’s afternoon presentations, and was treated to a talk by our friend Tom Clarke, director of the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection’s Division of Mining and Reclamation.

As WVDEP officials unfortunately do every year at this industry event, Tom played to his audience, trying to be funny with a couple of silly cracks about his fellow public servants at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. For example: “We’ve been getting along reasonably well with them, as long as we don’t make them work too hard.”

For some reason, Tom also was critical of efforts by U.S. EPA to incorporate certain portions of DEP mining permits into his agency’s Clean Water Act pollution discharge permits for mining operations. Why would that be such a bad thing? Well, Tom noted that if “performance standards” for things like toxic materials handling plans are made part of the Clean Water Act permits, it might allow citizen groups to bring lawsuits in federal court to actually have those provisions of the permits enforced.  Gosh, the last thing anybody would want is for citizens to actually get to play a meaningful role in the environmental regulatory process and do things that WVDEP has been unable or unwilling to do … things like, oh, I don’t know — forcing a major mining operator to spend hundreds of millions of dollars cleaning up its selenium pollution.

Tom spent a lot of time dissecting the recent U.S. EPA objection letter for the CONSOL of Kentucky Buffalo Mountain permit, and warning coal executives of all of the sorts of things EPA was questioning in that permit — kind of a cautionary tale for what other operators might be in store for from EPA in coming months. But I guess I must have missed the part where Tom explained exactly what his agency was doing to reduce the “pervasive and irreversible impacts” of mountaintop removal on the environment — let alone what WVDEP is doing about the increasingly clear links between living near mountaintop removal mining and having a greater risk of serious health problems like cancer and birth defects.

Don’t look for much discussion of those important issues at the symposium … but if you have time to drop by on Friday, you can catch not one, not two, not three, but four coal lobbyists in a panel discussion called “Obama’s No Job Zone.” And you can hear the lawyers from Bailey and Glasser talk about their taxpayer-funded lawsuit to help the coal industry try to put a stop to the Obama crackdown on mountaintop removal.

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MSHA announces next phase of ‘Rules to Live By’

Tuesday, January 31, 2012

Here’s today’s announcement from MSHA:

The U.S. Department of Labor’s Mine Safety and Health Administration today launched the third phase of an outreach and enforcement program designed to strengthen efforts to prevent mining fatalities. “Rules to Live By III: Preventing Common Mining Deaths” will focus on 14 safety standards that were chosen because violations related to each have been cited as contributing to at least five mining accidents and at least five deaths during the 10-year period of Jan. 1, 2001, to Dec. 31, 2010.

“The goal of this phase of ‘Rules to Live By’ is to reduce numbers of deaths and injuries from the targeted standards by having mine operators identify and correct all hazardous conditions, direct MSHA enforcement toward confirming that violations related to these conditions are not present at mines, and ensure miners are better trained to recognize and avoid these particular hazards,” said Joseph A. Main, assistant secretary of labor for mine safety and health.

From 2001 through 2010, 609 miners lost their lives in workplace accidents. Violations associated with eight coal standards contributed to 75 deaths during this period, while violations associated with six metal and nonmetal standards contributed to 50 deaths.

The coal standards are as follows:

75.362(a)(1) on-shift examination

77.404(a) machinery and equipment; operation and maintenance

77.405(b) performing work from a raised position; safeguards

77.1000 highwalls, pits and spoil banks; plans

77.1605(b) loading and haulage equipment; installations

77.1606(a) loading and haulage equipment; inspection and maintenance

77.1607(b) loading and haulage equipment; operation

77.1713(a) daily inspection of surface coal mine; certified person; reports of inspection

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Gov. Tomblin’s mine safety bill finally introduced

Tuesday, January 31, 2012

Gov. Earl Ray Tomblin waves to the crowd Wednesday, Jan. 11, 2012 prior to delivering his state of the state address at the Capitol in Charleston, W.Va. (AP Photo/Jeff Gentner)

UPDATED: The state mine safety office’s spokeswoman, Leslie Fitzwater says today:

The WVOMHS&T report [on the UBB Disaster]  is in the final stages of completion, and we expect to release it by the end of February 2012.

Nearly three weeks into the legislative session, and Gov. Earl Ray Tomblin’s mine safety bill — promised in the State of the State address — has finally been introduced. The Senate version is SB 448, and I’m told the House version should come out today.

Of course, the House leadership has its own legislation, and it will be interesting to see if lawmakers and the governor insist on weakening the language in one or a combination of these bills to ensure that the coal industry is on board with the changes — or if Delegate Mike Caputo can manage to get the Legislature to focus not on compromise but on what’s best for miners’ health and safety.

A few points to consider about the governor’s legislation:

–In expanding the requirements for new miners to work as supervised apprentices, the bill increases from 90 days to 120 days the length of time “red hat” miners must work within sight and sound of an experienced miner. The state Office of Miners’ Health, Safety and Training had wanted to increase that apprentice period to 180 days.

– The bill does not close a loophole that allows mine operators to not report serious accidents to the mine safety office — the folks who dispatch mine rescue teams — within 15 minutes, as long as they call local 911 dispatchers within that time period. The language proposed allows calls to the state’s industrial accident hotline to come 15 minutes after that initial notification to 911.

As we’ve discussed on this blog before (see here and especially here), it’s not clear what any of these bills will actually do to deal with the root of mine safety enforcement problems: The control of the political process, and therefore captive regulatory agencies, by the coal industry.

Speaking of agencies, one last interesting thing here is that, while we’ve seen reports from special investigator Davitt McAteer, the United Mine Workers, and the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration, we have not yet seen a report on the state mine safety office’s investigation of Upper Big Branch.  The last I heard, state investigators were to complete their report by the end of January, but it was not clear when it might be made public.

Former foreman sues Patriot in methane test scandal

Friday, January 27, 2012

The Associated Press is reporting on this, having picked up the story from the Morgantown Dominion Post:

An ex-mine foreman who admitted faking safety inspection reports is suing Patriot Coal Corp. and the Federal No. 2 mine bosses who he claims pressured him to falsify data. John Renner is awaiting sentencing on federal charges. He pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court in Clarksburg in March 2010, but prosecutors have repeatedly delayed his sentencing, citing his cooperation in an investigation of the mine.

The complaint says mine management pressured Renner to fake methane gas readings on sealed sections of the mine to avoid a shutdown that would have stopped coal production. The managers’ conduct was “atrocious, utterly intolerable in a civilized community and so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all possible bounds of decency,” the complaint charges.

We’ve reported on this before here, here and here, and noted that Federal No. 2 has long been held up by industry, labor and government officials as a model mine. Renner has never been sentenced in his criminal case, and the public has never really been told what’s going on with this investigation.

Why inspectors might hesitate to shut down a mine

Friday, January 27, 2012

Idaho Gov. Butch Otter waits for the commencement of a town hall meeting Monday, Jan. 23, 2012 in Wallace, Idaho where residents and business owners sought answers about the recent Lucky Friday Mine closure. (AP Photo/Coeur d’Alene Press, Jerome A. Pollos)

After 29 miners died in April 2010 at Massey Energy’s Upper Big Branch Mine here in West Virginia, a lot of people — including the local political leadership — made a lot of noise asking why, if conditions were so bad at Upper Big Branch, federal Mine Safety and Health Administration inspectors didn’t shut the place down. Well, if you really wonder about the answer to that question, look no farther than what’s going on right now out in Idaho, where the local media and the governor are raising quite a stink over closure of the much-troubled Lucky Friday silver mine.

Here’s the latest news from The Associated Press:

Gov. C.L. “Butch” Otter plans to ask federal regulators to hold a town hall meeting in northern Idaho and further explain the decision to close one of the nation’s deepest underground mines for safety reasons.

Otter traveled Monday to Wallace to discuss the closure of the Lucky Friday Mine earlier this month and economic conditions in the depressed Silver Valley region, where dozens of workers recently received a pink slip.

There was standing room only as Otter held a public meeting Monday in Wallace to discuss the shutdown of the mine with local families and business owners. Otter said he would ask federal mine regulators to hold a public meeting in the Silver Valley to further explain their decision.

“When I get home, that letter will be on its way to Washington, D.C.,” said Otter, who has also met with Hecla representatives to discuss the closure.

What exactly is MSHA up to here?

The federal Mine Safety and Health Administration ordered the operation closed following an investigation prompted by a series of accidents that killed two miners over the last year. The agency ordered Hecla Mining Co. for safety reasons to scrub the walls of the mile-deep shaft that is the main entrance to the mine.

Federal inspectors determined that sand and concrete material that had leaked from a pipe into a mine shaft over the years needed to be removed. The material is in the mile-deep Silver Shaft, the mine’s main access shaft, and workers will spend the next year essentially power washing the material from the walls of the shaft.

The shaft problems were flagged during a Dec. 20 inspection following two fatal accidents and a rock burst that trapped seven miners.

The Mine Safety and Health Administration’s closure order was initially issued Jan. 5, but Hecla officials said Jan. 11 that they had been negotiating for several days with federal regulators before resigning themselves to the lengthy shutdown.

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MSHA moving ahead with unenforceable dust rule

Friday, January 20, 2012

Despite legislation that prohibits it from being enforced — at least until the GAO completes a report on the proposal — the U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration has quietly announced plans to finalize its new rules aimed at ending black lung disease.

A new Labor Department regulatory schedule, posted on the Internet, but not publicly announced by the agency, lists a date for publication of the final rule as April 2012.  I asked MSHA spokeswoman Amy Louviere about it, and she said in an email:

The rider does not restrict MSHA’s ability to promulgate the rule, only MSHA’s ability to implement or enforce the rule.

U.S. records first coal-mining death of 2012

Friday, January 20, 2012

Sad news this morning from Virginia, where the first U.S. coal-mining death of 2012 has occurred. The accident happened  on Jan. 11 at CONSOL Energy’s Buchanan Mine where, according to the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration:

… A miner was struck in the face and forehead by a damaged fire fighting valve under high pressure on a 6-inch waterline The valve had been isolated by shutting off cut-off valves both inby and outby the damaged valve. It is believed one of the valves was allowing water to leak through, which caused pressure to build up at the damaged valve. The valve blew off while the victim was in the process of removing it, striking him in the face/forehead area. Another miner was hit in the shoulder by the valve after it contacted the initial victim. The miner was transported to a local medical facility and then to a larger hospital in Bristol, VA. He is reported to be stabilized, but in critical condition. The second miner did not appear to be hurt but was taken to the hospital to be checked as a precautionary measure.

MSHA added:

On Wednesday, the doctors attending the injured miner removed him from life support yesterday at 4:12 PM after brain activity ceased. He was unable to breath on his own and died shortly thereafter. This is the first Coal fatality for 2012.

Bill Archer at the Bluefield Daily Telegraph has identified the miner who died as Joe Saunders, 44, of Princeton, W.Va.

The Aracoma Mine Fire, Jan. 19, 2006

Thursday, January 19, 2012

My thoughts today are with the families of Don Bragg and Elvis Hatfield, the two coal miners who died six years ago in that terrible fire at Massey Energy’s Aracoma Alma No. 1 Mine in Logan County, W.Va.

As I wrote a year ago on this date, readers will recall that Massey Energy’s Aracoma Coal Co. pleaded guilty to criminal mine safety violations that led to their deaths, and paid a record $2.5 million in criminal fines and $1.7 million in civil penalties. Five Massey foreman also pleaded guilty to criminal charges, but none of them went to jail.

But the U.S. Department of Justice and then-U.S. Attorney Chuck Miller agreed to a plea deal with Aracoma Coal in which the government agreed not to prosecute any employees or officers of the corporate parent, Massey Energy. This deal drew much criticism from the widows of Mr. Bragg and Mr. Hatfield.

Prosecutors said they had no evidence of any criminal wrongdoing by Massey or its officers or employees, but lawyers for the families wondered about a key memo that indicated then-Massey CEO Don Blankenship knew about the poor condition of the conveyor belts at Aracoma and knew mine officials were not accurately reporting those conditions on mine safety reports.

In last year’s anniversary post, I questioned whether the criminal investigation of the deaths of 29 more Massey miners at the company’s Upper Big Branch Mine would end any differently:

What will come of this new criminal investigation? Will prosecutors bring charges against a few mid-level foremen, or will they find and try to punish wrongdoing by anyone further up the corporate ladder?

Over the last few months, we’ve seen a flurry of action on Upper Big Branch.  In late October, the mine’s longtime security director, Hughie Elbert Stover, was convicted of two felonies, with a jury finding that he lied to investigators and tried to destroy evidence about Massey’s habit of warning underground workers of impending safety inspections — a practice that federal inspectors say played a major role in the April 5, 2010, disaster.  Stover faces up to 25 years in prison. Already, a former Massey miner had pleaded guilty to faking foreman’s credentials while he spent almost two years performing safety inspections for the company at Upper Big Branch. While there’s no direct evidence the actions of Thomas Harrah played any role in the disaster, U.S. District Judge Irene Berger sentenced Harrah to 10 months in prison.

Then in December, as the U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration was preparing to issue the report of its investigation into Upper Big Branch, U.S. Attorney Booth Goodwin announced that his office had reached a landmark deal with Alpha Natural Resources, which bought Massey last June. Alpha would agree to spend tens of millions of dollars on mine safety improvements, and Goodwin would agree not to bring any criminal charges against the company.

And just last week, the remaining families of the Upper Big Branch miners settled their wrongful death cases, agreeing to a deal through with Alpha will pay them undisclosed amounts of money to resolve those cases and allow the company to, essentially, turn the page on the disaster it inherited from Massey CEO Don Blankenship.

The families have made it clear that they want justice — not just money. As one of the family lawyers, Tim Bailey, told me:

Compensation is one thing, but justice is another. Based on what happened at this mine, there is not going to be justice until some people are indicted and some people go to jail.

Will more people go to jail? Well, we know that the Alpha-Justice Department deal does not include language to protect any individual officers, agents or employees of Massey from prosecution … and U.S. Attorney Goodwin has said his office has uncovered other crimes for which the appropriate individuals have not yet been charged.  The question is — will Goodwin and his staff find a way to bring charges against these individuals and to make those charges stick? A more cynical person that I might also ask if higher-ranking officials at the Justice Department, with Goodwin’s Alpha deal already in their pockets, think it’s time to move on and pressure Goodwin to just drop it?

West Virginia political leaders certainly don’t have the stomach for much more talk about 29 coal miners getting blow up … Every chance they get, our local elected officials encourage us all to forget about the bad old days of Massey, and focus on the new leadership at Alpha (the “new ownership in Southern West Virginia“, as my friend Rep. Nick Rahall likes to say), forgetting about Alpha’s willingness to keep some top Massey managers on board – and about the fact that Alpha CEO Kevin Crutchfield can’t seem to bring himself to say publicly that UBB could have easily have been prevented and wasn’t any sort of Act of God. It takes a congressman from California – ranking Democrat on the Labor Committee, George Miller — to bother to ask Crutchfield about any of this.

Before anyone in the federal government decides they should just drop this criminal probe, I wonder if it might be worth them being put into a room for a while with the widows of Don Bragg and Elvis Hatfield or at least read what their lawyer, Bruce Stanley, told me last month:

Sadly, aggressive prosecution against upper management in the Aracoma case might have spared us the horror of UBB. We’ll never know, of course. But we certainly hope that the lesson of making deals with the devil has been learned, that the criminal investigation makes its way into the boardroom as well as the guard shack, and that Alpha chooses a different path than its predecessor.


Should we only have rules coal lobbyists agree to?

Tuesday, January 17, 2012

In case anyone missed it, I wanted to go back and focus some attention on remarks that our friend Delegate Mike Caputo, D-Marion (and a UMWA representative):

“I’m not saying ‘Something we can call agree on,’ I’m not saying ‘Compromise,’ I’m saying something that protects the health and safety of miners,” Caputo said. “If the industry doesn’t like it, that’s just too damn bad.”

That’s what Delegate Caputo told the Daily Mail’s Ry Rivard when asked about the House leadership’s new mine safety bill, introduced yesterday — ahead of legislation promised in last week’s State of the State address by Gov. Earl Ray Tomblin.

Delegate Caputo’s comments highlight what appears to me to be an increasing trend, in which political leaders don’t want to tackle tough issues at the statehouse before first making sure that a powerful industry isn’t going to derail their efforts. This happened here in West Virginia with last month’s special session on natural gas drilling in the Marcellus Shale. The governor’s office has said it hasn’t finalized its mine safety bill because it was still talking with industry lobbyists about it, to ensure there was consensus support for it.

What ever happened to proposing a bill you think is good, debating its merits, and then voting it up or down? That way, if lawmakers vote with industry over miners’ safety, the public will know and can base their own votes on Election Day accordingly …

W.Va. lawmakers introduce mine safety bill

Monday, January 16, 2012

Here’s the report just out from the AP’s Larry Messina:

For two West Virginia lawmakers who lost fathers in coal mining accidents, preventing disasters like the 2010 Upper Big Branch explosion has taken a personal turn.

House Speaker Rick Thompson was not yet born when a roof fall killed his father at age 21. Delegate Charlene Marshall’s dad died in the mines when she was 6.

Thompson and Marshall are among 11 lawmakers who introduced legislation Monday offering numerous ways to target unsafe mines.

The bipartisan bill would identify and then remedy the enforcement problems cited in the reports by Upper Big Branch investigators. That disaster killed 29 miners.

It also seeks to allow miners’ families to take part when fatal accidents are investigated. Both Thompson and Marshall said their families were left in the dark after their fathers died.

This, of course, comes after Gov. Earl Ray Tomblin talked up mine safety in his State of the State address, outlining a mixed package of measures, without actually having the legislation decided upon and ready to introduce. The Daily Mail’s Ry Rivard tweets that the governor’s bill should be introduced by Friday and that the plan is for a House Judiciary subcommittee to work on the competing proposals.

UPDATED: Ry has done a blog post on the Daily Mail’s Capitol Notebook, with this great quote from Delegate Mike Caputo, a UMWA representative, about whether mine safety legislation should be based on a consensus approach:

“I’m not saying ‘Something we can call agree on,’ I’m not saying ‘Compromise,’ I’m saying something that protects the health and safety of miners,” Caputo said. “If the industry doesn’t like it, that’s just too damn bad.”

You can read the bill for yourself here, and I’ve posted a fact sheet being distributed by the House leadership here. (note that two of the bill’s 11 co-sponsors are Republicans — one from Upshur County, where the Sago Disaster happened, and one from Raleigh County, where Upper Big Branch occurred).

Among other things, the bill would make it a crime for anyone to knowingly commit or willingly permit violations of state mine safety regulations. Current state law applies that sort of a standard to corporate mine operators and to any director, officer or agent of the corporation who knowingly authorized, ordered or carried out the violation.

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National Research Council starts mine rescue study

Monday, January 9, 2012

A government photo shows the SCSRs that Sago miners tried to use to survive after the January 2006 explosion.

Later this week, the National Academy of Sciences will begin a new study of mine rescue called, Mine Safety: Essential Components of Self Escape.  A summary describes the effort this way:

An ad-hoc committee of inter-disciplinary experts will conduct a study to identify and synthesize the literature relevant to understanding “self escape” in the context of mine safety. The committee will review literature in areas such as judgment and decision making under conditions of uncertainty and stress, training of personnel in high-risk professions, technological advancements that may facilitate self escape (e.g. signaling), physiological and biomechanical effects of stress, and systems approaches to improve the likelihood of success self escape. This study will focus on underground coal mining but with the understanding that findings and recommendations for that industry will likely be informative to the underground metal/nonmetal mining industry. Basically, the stated purpose of this study is: What does it take to give mine workers self-escape capabilities during a disaster?

Apparently, the National Institutes for Occupational Safety and Health, or NIOSH, asked for this study.  They study committee is going to address these issues:

1. Define “self escape” in the context of mining disasters;

2. Identify competencies which are essential for mine workers to have in order to allow them to execute self-escape methods, which will include cognitive competencies as in hazard recognition and decision making, as well as physical abilities;

3. Suggest the most effective training methods for the mining industry to adopt in order to impart those skills to miners and to validate individual competency levels of same;

4. Consider systems factors, such as escape way conditions, availability of refuge alternatives, or other technologies (such as through the implementation of communication systems and sensors) that would contribute to a successful self escape by providing the miner with improved decision-making capabilities, e.g. through the availability of information, and/or providing physical conditions that would make it easier to escape under adverse conditions;

5. Identify any “gaps” in scientific findings that could inform this issue, thus help to set a possible research agenda for future funding strategies for NIOSH.

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MSHA’s Joe Main: ‘Mining deaths are preventable’

Thursday, January 5, 2012

Here’s the statement issued this afternoon by the U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration:

Preliminary data from the U.S. Department of Labor’s Mine Safety and Health Administration released today reveal that 37 miners died in work-related accidents at the nation’s mines in 2011. There were 21 coal mining and 16 metal/nonmetal mining fatalities last year, compared with 48 and 23, respectively, in 2010, making 2011 the year with the second-lowest number of mining deaths since statistics were first recorded in 1910.

Of the 37 fatalities reported, 12 occurred at surface coal mines, 11 at surface metal/nonmetal mines, nine at underground coal mines and five at underground metal/nonmetal mines. Nine workers died in accidents involving machinery – six in coal mines and three in metal/nonmetal mines – making it the leading cause of fatal mining accidents.

Kentucky had the most mining deaths – eight – in 2011, followed by West Virginia with six and Ohio with three. All but one of those deaths occurred in coal mines. Several of the larger coal-producing states, including Alabama, Pennsylvania, Illinois and Utah, experienced zero mine fatalities last year.

“Mining deaths are preventable,” said Joseph A. Main, assistant secretary of labor for mine safety and health. “The year that the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 passed, 273 miners died and, since that time, fatality numbers have steadily declined. In order to prevent mine deaths, operators must have in place effective safety and health management programs that are constantly evaluated, find-and-fix programs to identify and eliminate mine hazards, and training for all mining personnel.”

MSHA has undertaken a number of measures to prevent mining deaths: increased surveillance and strategic enforcement through impact inspections at mines with troubling compliance histories; enhanced pattern of violations actions; special initiatives such as “Rules to Live By,” which focuses attention on the most common causes of mining deaths; and outreach efforts such as “Safety Pro in a Box,” which provides guidance to the metal/nonmetal mining industry on best practices and compliance responsibilities.

“It takes the entire mining community to continue to reach new milestones in health and safety,” said Main. “While fewer miners are dying on the job, we can never alter our focus because, as we know, things can change in a moment. Miners need the reassurance that they will return home safe and healthy after each shift.”

 

The Sago Mine Disaster, Jan. 2, 2006

Monday, January 2, 2012

Six years ago, an explosion ripped through International Coal Group’s Sago Mine in Upshur County, W.Va. Twelve miners died and another barely got out alive.

The miners killed were:

Tom Anderson, Terry Helms, Marty Bennett, Martin Toler, Marshall Winans, Junior Hamner, Jesse Jones, Jerry Groves, James Bennett, Jackie Weaver, Fred Ware, and David Lewis.

And as I’ve said before, it’s always worth remembering these words from the last Sen. Robert C. Byrd, spoken on the Senate floor after Sago:

I’ve seen it all before. First, the disaster, then the weeping and then the outrage. But in a few weeks, when the outrage is gone, when the ink on the editorials is dry, everything returns to business as usual.

USA Today: Prosecute rogue coal operators

Tuesday, December 20, 2011

An editorial in USA Today asks:

Even as federal officials were heralding this month’s $209 million settlement in one of the worst U.S. mining disasters in history, the families of the 29 men killed in that explosion were wondering: Isn’t anyone going to be prosecuted for our loved ones’ deaths?

The newspaper’s answer?

Good question. At least for now, the answer is no — a sad and unsatisfactory climax after nearly two years of criminal investigations, along with two damning reports that found mine owner Massey Energy put profits above safety and was so lax that it laid the groundwork for what one study called a “preventable” explosion at West Virginia’s Upper Big Branch Mine.

As I mentioned before, given the MSHA investigation report’s direct linking of the mine disaster to Massey’s policy for advance notice of government inspections, it’s probably unfair to say that neither of the two criminal cases brought so far by U.S. Attorney Booth Goodwin and his team had nothing to do with the April 5, 2010, explosion that killed 29 miners.  Longtime Upper Big Branch security director Hughie Elbert Stover was convinced of lying to investigators and trying to destroy evidence about this Massey policy, which MSHA’s report said directly contributed to the disaster by covering up some serious safety problems at the mine.

Given the extent of the safety problems that MSHA did find at Upper Big Branch, though, it remains unclear why agency officials didn’t do more to put a stop to the violations. It’s clear that MSHA didn’t use every tool in its toolbox prior to April 5, 2010 (see previous posts here and here). It’s all well and good for MSHA to tout its use of “flagrant penalties” at Upper Big Branch after 29 miners got blown up … why wasn’t this authority used before the disaster?

In its editorial, USA Today repeats the call for tougher criminal sanctions in the nation’s mine safety laws, to make it easier to hold executive responsible for serious and repeated violations. The newspaper concludes:

Attorney General Eric Holder and U.S. Attorney Booth Goodwin, of the Southern District of West Virginia, have pledged to continue investigating individuals associated with the Upper Big Branch tragedy. Let’s hope that their pledges are more meaningful than the empty promises of safe mines that families are so used to hearing from Congress and the industry.

For too long, safety-flouting companies have been able to buy their way out of trouble.

Not surprisingly, USA Today makes no mention of the growing evidence of MSHA’s own failings at Upper Big Branch — not a word from the newspaper’s editors about what independent investigator Davitt McAteer described as “proof positive that the agency failed its duty as the watchdog for coal miners.”

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House GOP tries to end effort to ‘End Black Lung’

Thursday, December 15, 2011

UPDATED: As we reported in Saturday’s Gazette-Mail, this little rider made it into the spending bill …

We’ve heard House Republicans talk quite a bit about how much they care about coal miners’ jobs … but what about those coal miners’ lives?

You have to wonder, when you see the GOP leadership sticking riders into appropriations bills like this one, described in a summary of a funding bill for the Department of Labor:

A prohibition on the implementation or enforcement of DOL’s “coal dust” rule until an independent assessment of the integrity of the data and methodology behind the rule is conducted.

That’s right, the majority party’s proposal for funding MSHA (see pages 35-36) would keep the agency from implementing the key provision of its campaign to End Black Lung, a deadly disease that claimed the lives of 10,000 coal miners in the last decade.

The GOP legislation would block MSHA from instituting a tougher coal-dust standard until the U.S. Government Accountability Office “evaluates the completeness of MSHA’s data collection and sampling, to include an analysis of whether such data supports current trends of the incidence of lung disease arising from occupational exposure to respirable coal mine dust across working underground coal miners.”

Never mind the peer-reviewed studies that show a resurgence of black lung in parts of the nation’s coalfields.  Never mind the data showing that miners working under what are currently legal levels of coal dust are developing black lung. And forget about the fact that public health and worker health experts have for years been urging MSHA to do exactly what agency chief Joe Main is trying to do — tighten the legal limit for coal dust.

I don’t know if there’s a war on coal, but you have to wonder if there’s really  a war on coal miners.

Why aren’t politicians calling on other operators to implement Alpha deal’s safety improvements?

Wednesday, December 14, 2011

I’ve been reading and re-reading the slew of prepared statements that West Virginia’s political leaders issued to comment on the $209.5 million Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster settlement U.S. Attorney Booth Goodwin and his staff worked out with Alpha Natural Resources. And there’s something that’s missing that I can’t get out of my head.

Where are the calls for the rest of the coal industry to follow Alpha’s lead on installing important new coal-dust meters and ventilation monitors that could help prevent the next mining disaster?

When he announced the settlement, U.S. Attorney Goodwin made one of his goals clear:

Collectively, the requirements will set a new standard for what can and should be done to protect miners. My hope is that Alpha’s adoption of the measures contained in this resolution will give the rest of the industry a strong push to follow suit.

The only reaction I’ve seen from the National Mining Association was this comment last week from their spokeswoman, Carol Raulston:

Many of NMA’s members, including Alpha, are already investing in safety efforts and equipment not specified/required by MSHA. We have not read the agreement between Alpha and the U.S. Attorney, so I cannot comment on any specific provision, including the equipment stipulations. As such, I am reluctant to speculate about future actions of NMA members as this time.

Maybe that’s because political leaders are letting the industry off so easy. The closest thing I saw for a call for action by the rest of the industry was this from Sen. Joe Manchin:

Even though Alpha did not own the Upper Big Branch mine at the time of the disaster, I applaud the company for taking responsibility for both the mistakes that were made and for investing in the future of mining to help prevent another tragedy like this from ever taking place. I encourage them – and all our mining companies – to continue to take steps to protect our miners.

Not exactly a very strong push to spread these important technologies beyond Alpha, huh? The only really strong comments I saw in this direction came from independent investigator Davitt McAteer:

The Settlement announced this morning adopts many of the recommendations which we set out in our report, I think what is important especially in the area of technology is that it at the very least puts Alpha in the position of adopting new safety and health technology and avoiding the federal regulatory quagmire which holds up or blocks entirely advances in the technology of detection and disaster prevention. Hopefully others in the coal industry will adopt a similar progressive approach to mine safety technology adoption rather than taking the position of doing nothing unless the federal or state government require it. In the past the industry has relegated safety and health innovations to a low priority hopefully this agreement will change that priority.