A report made public yesterday by the U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration won’t get much media attention. But it provides still more concrete evidence about why coal miners die on the job in America.

Travis Brock was 29 when he was killed on Jan. 22, 2010, at Bledsoe Coal Co.’s Abner Branch Rider Mine. The operation in Leslie County, Ky., is controlled by James River Coal Co.

Brock was killed when a piece of the mine rib, or wall, fell and pinned him against the mine floor. The MSHA investigation report — the little-noticed document I’m talking about — described that piece of mine rib this way:

The rock that fell broke into several pieces, with the total size measured at approximately 82 inches high, 66 inches long, and 108 inches wide. The total weight of the rock prior to breaking was approximately 9.3 tons.

Keep in mind that 30 C.F.R. 75.202 mandates that mine workers be protected from such accidents:

The roof, face and ribs of areas where persons work or travel shall be supported or otherwise controlled to protect persons from hazards related to falls of the roof, face or ribs and coal or rock bursts.

At about 8:30 that morning, Brock, a continuous miner operator, had just finished a cut. He then began to trim the area near the crosscut so that the roof there could be bolted. That’s when the mine wall collapsed onto him.

MSHA investigators found numerous hazards that could have warned that the mine wall wasn’t safe. According to the agency’s report:

There were numerous locations with loose coal/rock ribs on the 001 MMU, including the rib in the No. 3 Heading at #34 Crosscut that fell, causing fatal injuries to the continuous miner operator. There were also violations of the Approved Roof Control Plan at multiple locations on the 001 MMU. The maximum allowable entry width of the pillar shears was exceeded in two locations, creating excessive intersection widths. Roof support materials were not installed in accordance with the manufacturers recommendations; channel straps were installed over cracks and draw rock without using the correct bearing plates. The #2 Heading at #33 Crosscut was not bolted completely along the left rib. Six separate locations were identified as violations of the approved roof control plan.

But these problems weren’t identified in the mine’s pre-shift or on-shift safety examinations, and those reports indicate no steps taken to correct such problems. MSHA concluded:

This fatal accident occurred because the operator failed to support the rib on the 001 MMU to protect the miner. Additionally, the operator failed to conduct adequate preshift and on-shift examinations and ignored the hazardous rib conditions on the 001 MMU. And, the operator failed to change its Roof Control Plan to address the changing geological conditions which occurred on the 001 MMU.

MSHA investigators issued two citations and two more serious enforcement orders, concluding in one instance:

The operator has engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence in that management did not take measures to ensure safe working conditions around ribs …

And finding in another:

The operator has engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence in that the hazardous rib conditions were not found, and no action was taken, which led to the exposure of the Continuous Miner Operator to fatal crushing injuries. This violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard.

This entry was posted on Wednesday, June 2, 2010 at 6:00 am and is filed under Mine Safety. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.